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Microﬁnance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on
the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect
that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future,
then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run.
The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to
counter this tendency to default.
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11 Introduction
Microﬁnance is an increasingly important form of ﬁnancial intermediation. The suc-
cess of the Grameen Bank in making group loans to poor (and predominantly female)
borrowers in Bangladesh is especially well known. Microﬁnance institutions (hence-
forth MFIs) such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia,
the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand, and BancoSol
in Bolivia, are among the largest banks in their respective countries. There are over
3100 MFIs worldwide reaching at least 113 million people (Daley-Harris 2006).
Our starting point is the familiar observation that since MFI borrowers possess
limited collateral, an important source of repayment incentives is the prospect of
receiving future credit.1 A promise of future credit, along with a concomitant threat
of credit denial, can induce repayment as follows. A borrower who repays today’s
loan eﬀectively receives a claim to (valuable) future ﬁnancial access. The borrower
repays if the value of this claim exceeds the beneﬁt of defaulting on the loan. Notice,
however, that the expected value of a repaying borrower’s claim depends on how likely
other borrowers are to repay since that in turn aﬀects the viability of the MFI.
We show that such repayment externalities can lead to a coordination failure in
which borrowers choose to default because they expect that others will. We label
this coordination failure as a borrower run. Unlike the depositor runs that have
been widely analyzed in the literature (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and
Pauzner, 2005) borrower runs arise on the asset side of the intermediary’s balance
1This is clearest in the case of MFIs like Bank Rakyat Indonesia that grant individual loans
(Churchill 1999). Armendariz and Morduch (2000) present a formal model based on Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). It is equally true of group lending schemes: while many academic papers have
highlighted the role of groups in ameliorating information asymmetries (Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999), borrowers must still be induced to repay an uncollateralized group loan. Reﬂecting this,
most group lending schemes oﬀer a group of borrowers repeated loans over time (Morduch 1999).
2sheet.2
We model the strategic interaction between borrowers in a global games framework
(Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 2003). Each borrower receives
a private signal of future economic fundamentals. These fundamentals and the
MFI’s ﬁnancial position aﬀect the value of future ﬁnancial access, and hence the
incentive to repay. We compare two situations: with and without coordination
between borrowers. In both models, borrowers repay if the value of future ﬁnancial
access exceeds a threshold. The threshold for repayment is higher if there is no
coordination between borrowers. Strategic complementarity between borrowers in
their repayment decisions makes borrowers default even when collectively they would
prefer to repay. Borrower runs therefore weaken repayment incentives and lower
welfare.
We examine the eﬀect of borrower runs on the MFI’s choice of lending contract.
The MFI can increase incentives to repay in two ways. First, it can make loans that
are more proﬁtable, thereby increasing the value of future ﬁnancial access to repaying
borrowers. Second, the MFI can lower the repayment required on its loan. We show
that the MFI will always use at least one of these two repayment incentives as an
optimal response to borrower runs.
We also demonstrate that an MFI’s initial ﬁnancial resources are valuable in mit-
igating borrower runs. In particular, an additional dollar of funds reduces the prob-
ability of borrower runs. This in turn increases borrower welfare, since at least in
some borrower runs, borrowers would collectively prefer to repay than default.3
2The borrower runs we analyze are also distinct from the default equilibrium that Besley and
Coate (1995) discuss as a drawback of group lending. In their model, an individual will default if
others in his group choose to do so because he is liable for their repayment and will be punished even
if he repays. In our model repayment externalities do not arise because of the joint liability terms
of the group loan contract, but are instead related to the future viability of the lending institution.
3Of course, increasing the MFI’s funds also has a direct eﬀect on borrower welfare simply because
3Borrower runs may be a concern in any context where repayment is supported by
the threat of credit denial. In this paper we focus on the implications of borrower runs
for microﬁnance practice, and discuss other possible ﬁnancial-contagion applications
in Section 5. There is some anecdotal evidence that borrower runs have contributed
to the collapse of microﬁnance programs. For example, in the case of Childreach
in Ecuador, “the number of residents defaulting on loans multiplied as the word
spread that few people were paying, that what had been repaid was being pilfered
by community leaders in at least a quarter of the communities, and that Childreach
was taking little action” (see Goering and Marx, 1998). In terms of our model,
since the viability of Childreach had been called to question, default became more
attractive for each individual borrower. Related, Paxton et al (2000) empirically
analyze repayment behavior within groups in a Burkina Faso microﬁnance program,
but also write:
In one urban sector that experienced widespread default, rumors of
unethical behavior led the entire sector to collapse. In any sector, the
ﬁrst group may default for any number of reasons, but once this occurs the
whole sector tends to collapse. In the words of PPPCR [the microﬁnance
program analyzed] founder Konrad Ellsasser, the success of group lending
can be likened to an airplane: if even one part fails, the plane cannot ﬂy.
Not surprisingly, microﬁnance practitioners appear to be actively concerned about
“contagion” defaults of this kind. For example, van Maanen (2004), a former man-
aging director of one of the world’s largest private capital providers of microﬁnance,
writes:
the MFI is able to lend more. The welfare gain discussed in the main text is in addition to this
direct eﬀect.
4Once the [repayment] percentage sinks below 80% then it is very dif-
ﬁcult to reverse that trend, because the virus travels faster than any
medicine: [a borrower thinks to himself] ‘why should I repay an MFI
that is likely to go down? Let me wait and see what happens!’
1.1 Paper outline
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 dis-
cusses a benchmark in which borrowers coordinate to prevent borrower runs. Section
4 explores the eﬀect of borrower runs on welfare and on lending terms. Section 5
discusses other possible applications. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
There is a continuum of identical borrowers who need outside ﬁnance to make invest-
ments. Loans are made by a microﬁnance institution (MFI) that aims to maximize
the welfare of the borrowers.4 The MFI has initial funds A0 per borrower. The MFI
uses these funds to make loans, with loan size L and required repayment (face value)
F. The loan terms L and F are endogenously determined. The MFI cannot lend
out more than its initial funds (i.e., L ≤ A0), and borrowers cannot repay more than
their project return (i.e., F ≤ H (L)). The MFI earns a rate of return of ρ > 1 on
any funds A0−L that it does not lend out. In order to apply results from the global
games literature (see below), it is necessary to rule out “loan” contracts with very low
values of F, that is, grants. We assume that there is a strictly positive lower bound
4MFIs face substantial ﬁxed costs of operations. For this reason, we assume that the MFI deals
with many borrowers. It would be straightforward to incorporate a ﬁxed cost explicitly into the
formal analysis.
5on the required repayment, i.e., F ≥ F > 0,5 where F can be arbitrarily small.
The timing is as follows. The MFI chooses the contract terms L and F, and
makes loans. Borrowers invest any funds they receive. If a borrower invests L
today, his return is H (L), where H (L) is concave and H′ (L) → 1 as L → ∞. After
output is realized, borrowers simultaneously decide whether to repay or to default.
Let α ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction of borrowers who repay. The MFI’s funds per
borrower after repayment are thus
A(α;L,F) ≡ ρ(A0 − L) + αF. (1)
We take the MFI’s objective to be the maximization of borrower welfare.
The only diﬃculty that the MFI faces is that of enforcing repayments. To en-
force repayment F, the MFI promises future ﬁnancial access to borrowers who repay
and denies future ﬁnancial access to borrowers who default. The value of future
loans from the MFI depends on the MFI’s ﬁnancial resources A, on the fraction α
of borrowers who repay, and on future economic fundamentals. We denote future
economic fundamentals by x, where x is a random variable drawn uniformly from
[0, ¯ x]. Higher values of x indicate more proﬁtable investment opportunities for all
borrowers and hence increase the value of future ﬁnancial access. The realization of
x is determined after the initial loan L is made, but before repayment decisions. In
keeping with MFI practice, we restrict attention to standard debt contracts in which
F is not contingent on the realization of the fundamental x.6
5This is natural in a richer model: suppose there exist a large number of agents, some with
projects and some without. Suppose further that each agent in the economy has a small amount of
collateral F. Then the MFI needs to set F > F in order to screen out the project-less borrowers.
Rajan (1992) makes a similar assumption to rule out grants.
6In Appendix B we consider the opposite extreme in which the MFI can both discover x and
write a contract in which the repayment F is contingent on x. Our main result – borrower runs
reduce repayment incentives – is largely unaﬀected by allowing such contingencies.
6Let v(x,A,α) denote the value of the future loans from the MFI where v is
assumed to be continuous in fundamental x, funds A and fraction who repay α.7
One simple parameterization is v(x,A,α) = xPr
￿
A + ξ ≥ ¯ A
￿
, where ξ is a shock
to MFI funds, ¯ A is the minimum amount of funds required for the MFI to continue
operation, and x represents the borrower’s value of a continued relationship with the
MFI.
More generally, we conduct our analysis under the following assumptions on
v(x,A,α):
A1. State monotonicity, v(x,A,α) is strictly increasing in x: The value of future
loans is higher when economic conditions are favorable. Moreover, v is linear
in x.
A2. v(x,A,α) strictly increasing in A: The value of future loans is higher if the
MFI has more ﬁnancial resources.
A3. Lower dominance, v (0,A,α) = 0: Default is a dominant strategy for realizations
of the fundamental x that are suﬃciently low.
A4. Upper dominance, v(¯ x,0,0) > H (A0): The value of future loans exceeds the
highest repayment that can possibly be required, H(A0), for x suﬃciently high,
independent of what other borrowers repay. As such, repayment is a dominant
strategy for high enough fundamentals.8
7Fully speciﬁed models of ﬁnancial market exclusion can be found in, for example, Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990), Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004), Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota
(1996).
8The fact that v (¯ x,A,0) > H (A0) even when A = 0 can be motivated by assuming that even an
MFI with no funds (A = 0) has a small chance of receiving new outside ﬁnancing. (This probability
of new funds can be made arbitrarily small if the best fundamental ¯ x is simultaneously made large.)
7A5. Strict strategic complementarity,
∂
∂α
v(x,A(α),α) = FvA + vα > 0. (2)
The incentive to repay is strictly increasing in the proportion of borrowers who
repay. By A2, the term vA is positive. In general, the term vα may be
either positive (if, for example, donors reward MFIs with high repayment rates);
negative (if a ﬁxed quantity of MFI resources are shared among more repaying
borrowers); or zero. The content of the assumption is that even if vα is negative
the ﬁrst term dominates.









diminishes as repayment rates rise. In the special case when v has no direct
dependence on α, i.e. if the continuation utility is v(x,A), this assumption is
just log concavity of v in A. This assumption is used only for Propositions 3
and 4, for which it is suﬃcient but not necessary.
A7. vA (¯ x,A,1) > 1, i.e., at the highest realization of x an additional dollar is more
valuable to the borrower in the hands of the MFI. This assumption is only used
to establish Lemma 1.
Strategic complementarity (A5) is a natural feature of the repayment game we
study — the more funds an MFI has, the more value a borrower places on a continued
relation with the MFI. Economically, strategic complementarity potentially generates
8multiple equilibria in repayment behavior (Cooper and John, 1988). To see this,
suppose for now that all borrowers perfectly observe the realization of the economic
fundamental x. From A5, v (x,A(1;L,F),1) > v(x,A(0;L,F),0). So there exists
both an equilibrium in which all borrowers repay, and an equilibrium in which all
default, if x is such that
v(x,A(1;L,F),1) ≥ F ≥ v (x,A(0;L,F),0). (3)
The ﬁrst inequality in (3) says that if all other borrowers repay, an individual borrower
prefers repaying to defaulting. The second inequality says the reverse: if all other
borrowers default, an individual borrower prefers defaulting to repaying. Note that
the default equilibrium entails a coordination failure: by the ﬁrst inequality of (3),
borrower welfare is higher in the repayment equilibrium.
From (3), the set of possible economic fundamentals [0, ¯ x] can be partitioned into
three intervals: low fundamentals, for which the only equilibrium is for all borrowers
to default; intermediate fundamentals, for which both default and repayment are
equilibria; and high fundamentals, for which the only equilibrium is for all borrowers
to repay.9
In Section 4 below, we relax the assumption that the realization of x is common
knowledge among borrowers by instead assuming that each borrower observes x with
a small amount of noise. Assumptions A1, A3 and A4 together allow us to exploit
well-known global games results on equilibrium uniqueness (Morris and Shin 2003).
Before doing so, however, we characterize a benchmark case in Section 3 in which
borrowers are somehow able to avoid the coordination failure discussed above, and
instead always play the equilibrium that maximizes their welfare.
9Note that there is a no stable equilibrium in which a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of borrowers repay. Such
an equilibrium would require v (x,A(α;L,F),α) = F, and so by A5 and (3), both complete default
and complete repayment would also be equilibria. Moreover, again by A5 the partial repayment
equilibrium is not stable.
93 Coordination Benchmark
From the above discussion, in the coordination benchmark borrowers repay a loan
contract (L,F) if and only if the economic fundamental x exceeds a cutoﬀ value







Lemma 1 The threshold X1(L,F) exists and is unique.
The proof is in Appendix A.
The MFI chooses the contract terms (L,F) to maximize borrower welfare. In the
coordination benchmark, borrower welfare is simply
W





(v (x,A(1;L,F),1) − F)dx,
and so the MFI chooses (L,F) to solve maxL≤A0,F∈[F,H(L)] W 1 (L,F). Observe that
if the MFI optimally chooses to retain some of its initial funds, L < A0, then each
borrower’s marginal return, H′ (L), must be lower than the rate of return on unlent
funds, ρ. The reason is that the MFI only beneﬁts from holding onto funds if the
borrowers repay, and this occurs with a probability less than one.
Lemma 2 The optimal loan size in the coordination benchmark is such that either
H′(L) < ρ, or L = A0.
The proof is in Appendix A. Lemma 2 is used below in the proof of Proposition
4
4 Borrower Runs
We now turn to the heart of our analysis, and examine the eﬀects of a coordination
failure on repayment. We shall label this coordination failure as a borrower run,
10and compare outcomes to the benchmark case of Section 3 in which borrowers can
coordinate to avoid borrower runs.
As we noted in Section 2, multiple equilibria may exist when borrowers perfectly
observe the fundamental x. This multiplicity makes it diﬃcult to specify the MFI’s
optimal lending contract when borrowers cannot coordinate their repayment deci-
sions. So for the remainder of the paper, and following the global games literature,
we introduce slight uncertainty to borrower information about the fundamental x.
This generates a unique equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that borrowers do not directly observe x, but instead each
borrower i receives a signal yi = x + σεi, where εi are independently and identically
distributed across borrowers. The parameter σ indexes the variance of the noise
term in the signal. When the variance is suﬃciently small, standard results from the
theory of global games imply that there is a unique equilibrium for each realization
of the fundamental x. That is, as the noise becomes small each borrower follows a





∗,A(α;L,F),α) − F)dα = 0. (5)
Moreover, note that as noise becomes small (σ → 0) borrower signals coincide with
the fundamental x, and so the equilibrium converges to one in which all borrowers
default for fundamentals x < X∗ and all borrowers repay for fundamentals x ≥ X∗.
Note that the introduction of noise to borrower information about x has no
eﬀect on the coordination benchmark, since given the fundamental x aﬀects bor-
rowers equally, coordinating borrowers would happily report their signals of x, and
their signals collectively reveal the true realization. Our ﬁrst main result is that
X∗ (L,F) > X1 (L,F) for any loan contract, and so in equilibrium borrowers default
10See Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin (2003).
11more often than in the coordination benchmark. That is, for fundamentals x in
the range (X1 (L,F),X∗(L,F)) borrowers default in equilibrium, even though they
would repay in the coordination benchmark. We refer to such equilibrium outcomes
as borrower runs.
To establish that X∗ (L,F) > X1 (L,F), simply note that by strategic comple-
mentarity (A5), v (X∗,A(α),α) is increasing in α, and so (5) implies that11
v (X






Since vx > 0 (by A1), it follows that X∗ (L,F) > X1 (L,F). Summarizing:
Proposition 1 X∗ (L,F) > X1 (L,F): The MFI is subject to a coordination failure,
where borrowers fail to repay because they anticipate others failing to repay. That is,
borrower runs occur.
Coordination failures arise in the repayment game because by making a repayment
each borrower is improving the MFI’s ﬁnancial position, and hence increasing the
repayment incentive of other borrowers. However, each individual borrower ignores
this externality, and so there is too little repayment relative to the coordination
benchmark. Borrowers would collectively prefer to repay if X1(L,F) < x < X∗(L,F)
since the value of future loans dominates defaulting but repayment externalities lead
to default instead. Borrower runs therefore lower welfare.
Put more formally, as σ → 0 (the variance of the noise term approaches zero), the
MFI’s welfare converges to






11To see this, note that if instead v (X∗,A(1),1) − F ≤ 0, then the integral in (5) is strictly
negative.
12For a given loan contract (L,F), the diﬀerence in borrower welfare between the co-
ordination benchmark and borrower-run case is thus
W





(v (x,A(1),1) − F)dx.
Recall that by deﬁnition v(X1 (L,F),A(1),1) − F = 0. Hence by A1 welfare is
higher in the coordination benchmark, W 1(L,F) > W (L,F). Since this is true for
any loan contract, it follows that:
Proposition 2 The maximal attainable welfare is strictly lower than in the coordi-
nation benchmark. That is, borrower runs lower welfare.
The existence of borrower runs aﬀects the value of MFI funds A0, as follows.













∗ (L,F),A(1),1) − F).
(7)
The ﬁrst term in (7) represents the direct eﬀect of increasing A0, namely that it
increases borrowers’ utility at fundamentals x in which they repay. The second term
corresponds to the eﬀect of A0 on the probability that borrowers repay, determined
by X∗ (L,F). As one would expect, greater MFI resources increase the repayment
probability, i.e.,
∂X∗(L,F)
∂A0 < 0.12 Moreover, v(X∗ (L,F),A(1),1) − F > 0 because
defaulting at fundamental X∗ (L,F) is a coordination failure (see (6)), and so the
second term of (7) is also positive.
In contrast, in the coordination benchmark an increase in funds A0 increases








(vA (x,A(1),1) − F)dx. (8)
12This follows from A1, A2 and (5).
13In the coordination benchmark a change in A0 has only a direct eﬀect. Of course, a
change in A0 increases the repayment probability in this case also (i.e.,
∂X1(L,F)
∂A0 < 0).
However, no welfare gain is associated with this change, because by construction at
the fundamental X1 (L,F) borrowers are collectively indiﬀerent between repaying and
defaulting.13
From this discussion, borrower runs increase the value of initial funds A0 relative to
the coordination benchmark, because under borrower runs an increase in A0 mitigates
the associated coordination failure:
Proposition 3 WA0 > W 1
A0: Holding the loan contract ﬁxed, initial funds are more
valuable than in the coordination benchmark. That is, borrower runs increase the
importance of initial funds.
The proof is in Appendix A. Relative to the above discussion, the main diﬃculty
lies in handling the fact that the direct eﬀect of A0 in expressions (7) and (8) is
diﬀerent because X (L,F) and X1 (L,F) are distinct.
An increase in the loan size L increases a borrower’s welfare from the initial loan,
but acts like a decrease in A0 in terms of its eﬀect on future borrower welfare. Con-
sequently, an immediate implication of Proposition 3 is that for any given repayment
F, borrower runs lead the MFI to scale back the initial loan size L (relative to the
coordination benchmark):
Corollary 1 WL < W 1
L, and so for any repayment level F the MFI chooses a smaller
loan size than in the coordination benchmark. That is, borrower runs lead to smaller
loans (holding F ﬁxed).
13The fact that a change in A0 has only a direct eﬀect in the coordination benchmark is just the
envelope theorem: in the coordination benchmark, borrowers choose the repayment threshold X1 to
maximize their collective welfare.
14An important implication of Corollary 1 is that for any given face value of debt
F borrower runs lead the MFI to increase the proﬁtability/reduce the subsidy of its
loans, in the sense of increasing F − ρL.
Raising the repayment F required on loans has both a direct eﬀect (higher repay-
ments are costly to the borrower) and an indirect eﬀect (the MFI’s ﬁnancial position
is stronger, giving the borrower more incentive to repay). The net eﬀect is hard to
sign. However, if the MFI raises F by one dollar and raises L by 1
ρ or more, the loan
is less proﬁtable (even if repaid) and the MFI has a weaker ﬁnancial position. In
this case both the direct and indirect eﬀects act in the same direction, and discourage
repayment.
Because borrower runs reduce repayment incentives, the MFI needs to change the
loan terms in some way to increase repayment. From the above, it follows that it
either increases the proﬁtability of the loan, or decreases the required repayment F,
or does both. In contrast, the MFI deﬁnitely does not both increase F and reduce
the proﬁtability of the loan.
Formally, let (L1,F 1) and (L∗,F ∗) be optimal loan contracts in the coordination
benchmark and the borrower-run problem, respectively. We prove:
Proposition 4 At least one of the following is true: (A) The optimal loan contract
under borrower runs is more proﬁtable, in the sense that F ∗ − ρL∗ ≥ F 1 − ρL1; or
(B) the optimal required repayment is lower under borrower runs, F ∗ ≤ F 1. Both
relations are strict if L1 < A0.
The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 says that borrower runs cause the MFI to either increase loan prof-
itability, so as to increase the relationship value it can oﬀer to repaying borrowers, or
decrease the repayment request. Moreover, in a couple of special cases one can say
even more.
15Suppose ﬁrst that the repayment feasibility constraint binds in the coordination
benchmark, i.e., F 1 = H (L1). Then if the MFI were to ask for a higher repayment
F it would need to oﬀer a higher loan L and that would reduce its proﬁts (by Lemma
2). This is clearly a contradiction of Proposition 4. Therefore, the MFI must reduce
the repayment required:
Corollary 2 If the repayment feasibility constraint binds in the coordination bench-
mark, then the optimal repayment request is lower with borrower runs, F ∗ ≤ F 1 (strict
if L1 < A0). That is, borrower runs lead to a reduction in F.
Suppose next that the feasibility constraint binds in both the benchmark and
borrower-run problems. From Corollary 2, the optimal loan repayment F is lower
with borrower runs. Since the borrower repayment constraint binds in both problems,
it follows that the loan size is also smaller. Finally, since output H is subject to
decreasing returns, proﬁtability is higher in the borrower-run problem. So borrower
runs have the following eﬀect:
Corollary 3 If the repayment feasibility constraint binds in both the benchmark and
borrower-run problems, then the optimal loan size and repayment request are lower
with borrower runs, i.e. L∗ ≤ L1 and F ∗ ≤ F 1, and loan proﬁtability is higher,
F ∗ − ρL∗ ≥ F 1 − ρL1 (all strict if L1 < A0).
5 Other applications
Thus far we have focused on the impact of borrower runs on microﬁnance. However,
in principle borrower runs can occur in any context where repayment is supported by
the threat of credit denial. Informal lending relationships and credit cooperatives
resemble microﬁnance in this respect, and are obvious examples.
16Like microﬁnance loans, international debt transactions are widely believed to be
supported by the promise of future credit. Consequently commercial banks that
specialize in international lending or the World Bank and IMF may themselves be
susceptible to borrower runs. Empirically, the possibility of a borrower run occurring
could generate a form of ﬁnancial contagion: if investors fear that country B will
default because country A has done so, then yields will rise on country B’s bonds.14
In our model, default by one borrower reduces the repayment incentives of other
borrowers because it reduces a borrower’s expected value of future ﬁnance from the
MFI. As discussed, in microﬁnance the promise of future ﬁnance is one of the main
(and sometimes the only) motives for a borrower to repay. In contrast, most tradi-
tional bank loans are heavily collateralized. However, even in this context the large
literature on relationship banking (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994) suggests that
default by one borrower imposes a negative externality on other borrowers. Evidence
for this negative externality is provided by Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002), who
show that small borrowers pay higher interest rates when their lending bank suﬀers
losses. It follows that to the extent to which bank loans are less than 100% collater-
alized borrower runs may impact even traditional banks. As with sovereign debt, one
implication is a contagion eﬀect whereby default by one borrower increases default by
other borrowers. Moreover, since borrower runs reduce the proﬁtability of lending,
and are more likely for a lending institution with low assets (A0 in our model), our
model provides a possible explanation for “credit crunches.”15
14Financial contagion may arise for a variety of reasons including trade or ﬁnancial links between
countries and/or herding behavior of lenders (see Kaminsky et al (2003) for a review). Our model
diﬀers from other theories in that contagion stems from an increase in default probabilities caused
by a decrease in the viability of a shared lender.
15We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Credit crunches are episodes in which bank
losses lead to a reduction in lending activity, and are the object of study of a large literature (see,
e.g., Bernanke et al, 1991). The main problem in deﬁnitively identifying credit crunches is that
176 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze coordination failures in the repayment of loans to microﬁ-
nance institutions. We label these coordination failures borrower runs. If borrowers
expect that the defaults of others will lower their own future gains from microﬁnance,
then they too will have an incentive to default. We show that such contagion defaults
occur with positive probability in the unique equilibrium of our model.
Microﬁnance institutions may have a hard time establishing credibility because
of borrower runs. Proposition 3 establishes that initial funds are more crucial to
an MFI when it is faced with borrower runs. Without suﬃcient donor funds or
enough start-up capital, MFIs may not be able to make it oﬀ the ground as strategic
interaction between borrowers who are unsure of the MFI’s viability may lead to its
failure.
There is considerable emphasis on proﬁt making (or ﬁnancial self sustainability)
in current microﬁnance practice (Drake and Rhyne, 2002). This is one possible
response of MFIs to borrower runs (Proposition 4). Under some circumstances
(for example, Corollaries 1 and 3), the MFI will always respond to borrower runs
by making its loans more proﬁtable. While there are certainly other reasons that
microlenders stress proﬁt making and their desire to reduce reliance on subsidies, our
paper suggests that providing repayment incentives in the face of borrower runs could
be a possible motivation.
Finally, we have analyzed how the MFI can change the terms of its current loan
contract to reduce the welfare impact of borrower runs. The model in our paper is
a static model and the value of future loans is represented by v(x,A,α), which we
have taken as exogenous to the MFI and borrowers. Economically, one can think of
they are hard to empirically distinguish from economic shocks that reduce the demand for loans.
Much of the literature is concerned with this issue.
18this restriction as reﬂecting limited commitment on the part of the MFI,16 so that
v(x,A,α) is determined by optimizing decisions made after repayment. If instead
one relaxes this assumption, the MFI could also potentially mitigate or even eliminate
borrower runs by changing its future loan terms. In particular, since runs arise from
strategic complementarity in repayments, the MFI could oﬀer especially generous
loans to borrowers who repay when others do not. Such future loan terms could
eliminate strategic complementarity and hence prevent borrower runs. We leave a
formal analysis for future research.
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21A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: By A1, v is strictly increasing in x, with v (x = 0,A,α) ≡ 0
by A3. At the other extreme,





¯ x,A(1;L,0) + ˜ F,1
￿
d ˜ F.
By A7, vA (¯ x,A,1) > 1. So v(¯ x,A(1;L,F),1) > F. So a solution to equation
(4) exists and is unique. QED

















(vA (x,A(1;L,F),1) − 1)dx.
We have used v(X1 (L,F),A(1;L,F),1) = F in calculating these terms. If L < A0
it is always possible to increase L by ε and F by εH′ (L), without violating the









































If H′ (L) ≥ ρ this expression is clearly strictly positive. It follows that H′(L) < ρ at
the optimal (interior) loan size. QED
22Proof of Proposition 3: The following derivatives are used in this proof (and in










































∗ (L,F),A(1),1) − F).
Next, note that the partial derivative with respect to A0 is related to WL by
WA0 = −(WL − H
′ (L)).
The analogous relation holds for the benchmark problem. We prove that W 1
L−WL >
0, which is equivalent to W 1















Substituting in for X∗











































To complete the proof, since by Proposition 1 (which follows from strategic comple-




















v(X∗,A(α),α) , and by A6
this is decreasing in α. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: If L1 = A0 the result is immediate, since the only way
the no-coordination contract can be less proﬁtable is if F ∗ ≤ F 1. The remainder
of the proof deals with the case in which L1 < A0. We must show that either
F ∗ − ρL∗ > F 1 − ρL1 or F ∗ < F 1. Suppose to the contrary that F ∗ ≥ F 1 and
F ∗ − ρL∗ ≤ F 1 − ρL1.
The key to this result is to show




F for any λ ∈ [0,ρ]. (9)
The result is implied by (9), as follows. If L∗ = L1 then F ∗ = F 1 also. Note that
H′(L1) < ρ by Lemma 2. In this case, we have a contradiction since W 1
L (L1,F 1) +
H′(L1)W 1












24This contradicts the optimality of L∗,F ∗ since it implies the MFI would be better
of decreasing L∗ by ε and F ∗ by ρε (this perturbation is feasible since H′(L∗) < ρ).
If instead L∗ > L1, we can write F ∗ = F 1 + λ(L∗ − L1) for some λ ∈ [0,ρ]. The






























































From (9), W 1 (L∗,F ∗)−W 1 (L1,F 1) > W (L∗,F ∗)−W (L1,F 1). Since L∗ and F ∗ are
optimal choices, W (L∗,F ∗)−W (L1,F 1) ≥ 0. But then W 1 (L∗,F ∗)−W 1 (L1,F 1) >
0, contradicting the optimality of L1 and F 1 in the benchmark problem.




















F and F = v (X1,A(1),1), and recalling that v is linear in x
by A1,
¯ x(W 1
L + W 1










This is positive since by strategic complementarity (A5), vx (X∗,A(1),1) > vx (X∗,A(α),α)
for any α. Thus
W
1
L − WL + ρW
1
F − ρWF > 0.
Since W 1
L − WL > 0 (from Corollary 1), it follows that for any λ ∈ [0,ρ],
W
1







i.e., inequality (9). QED
25B Contingent Loan Contracts
In the main text we restrict attention to loan contracts in which the required repay-
ment F is not allowed to depend on the realization of the fundamental x. Most MFIs
appear to use simple non-contingent debt contracts of this form.
In this appendix we brieﬂy consider the opposite extreme in which the required
repayment F can be made contingent on the fundamental x in an arbitrary way. For
expositional ease, we assume that the MFI directly observes the fundamental x. (We
would obtain similar results if the MFI observes only a noisy signal of x, where the
variance of the noise term is small.)
Speciﬁcally, suppose now that the MFI chooses loan terms L and F : [0, ¯ x] → ℜ
to maximize borrower welfare
H (L) + Ex [α(x;L,F(x))(v (x,A(α(x;L,F(x));L,F(x)),α(x;L,F(x))) − F(x))],
where as before α(x;L,F(x)) denotes the fraction of borrowers who repay for a given
realization of the fundamental x and the loan contract (L,F( )). As in the main
text we continue to assume that the MFI cannot lend out more than its initial funds
(i.e., L ≤ A0) and that borrowers cannot repay more than their project return (i.e.,
F(x) ≤ H (L) for all x).
First, consider the repayment condition for the benchmark problem (as in section
3). For any realization of the fundamental x, borrowers repay F (x) if and only if
x ≥ X1(L,F (x)), where X1 ( , ) is as deﬁned in the main text in equation (4).
Second, consider the repayment condition for the no-coordination problem with
near perfect information (as in section 4). An issue that arises here is that if F
is fully contingent on x (i.e., if x1  = x2 then F (x1)  = F (x2)) the contract terms
reveal the fundamental x to borrowers. That is, F (x) acts as a public signal of
the fundamental x. In this case, the repayment game is one of perfect information,
26and multiple equilibria may exist. To circumvent this problem we assume that the
MFI introduces a small amount of noise into its repayment request, and that the
variance of this noise approaches zero more slowly than does the standard deviation
of borrowers’ signals about the fundamental. Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin
(2003) show17 that under these conditions the repayment equilibrium in the near-
perfect information case without public signals remains the unique equilibrium even
when the public signal is introduced. Thus for any realization of the fundamental x
the borrowers repay F (x) if and only if x ≥ X∗(L,F (x)), where X∗ ( , ) is as deﬁned
in equation (5). (Alternately, one could justify this equilibrium by simply assuming
that borrowers do not update their estimate of x from the contract terms F (x).)
From Proposition 1, we know that X∗(L,F) > X1(L,F) for any value of x.
Consequently:
Corollary 4 Suppose the loan contract has contingencies of the form (L,F(x)). Then
the MFI is repaid after more realizations of the fundamental x in the benchmark prob-
lem than in the no-coordination problem. That is, borrower runs reduce repayment.
17See Theorem 1(ii) of Hellwig (2002) and section 3.3 of Morris and Shin (2003)
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